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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As a tax base, "consumption" is sometimes argued to be less fair than
"income" because the benefits of not taxing capital income accrue to high-
income households. We argue that, despite the common perception that
consumption taxation eliminates all taxes on capital income, consumption
and income taxes actually treat similarly much of what is commonly called
capital income. Indeed, relative to an income tax, a consumption tax
exempts only the tax on the opportunity cost of capital. In contrast to a
pure income tax, a consumption tax replaces capital depreciation with
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capital expensing. This change eliminates the tax on the opportunity cost
of capital, but does not change, relative to the income tax, the tax treat-
ment of capital income arising from a risk premium, inframarginal profit,
or luck. Because these components of capital income are more heavily
skewed toward the top of the distribution of economic well-being, a con-
sumption tax is more progressive than would be estimated under conven-
tional distributional assumptions. We prepare distribution tables and
demonstrate that this modification is quantitatively important.
1. INTRODUCTION
Critics often claim that, as a tax base, "consumption" is less fair than
"income" because the benefits of not taxing capital income accrue to
high-income households. As is often noted, this claim depends critically
on the time frame for analyzing fairness; consumption taxes may be less
regressive from a lifetime perspective than an annual perspective (see,
e.g., Davies, St. 1-Tilaire, and Whalley, 1984; Poterba, 1989; and Fullerton
and Rogers, 1993).
In this paper, we argue that, despite the common perception that con-
sumption taxation eliminates all taxes on capital income, consumption
and income taxes actually treat similarly much of what is commonly called
"capital income." In fact, not all of what is commonly called capital income
escapes the consumption tax. In principle, one can decompose capital
income into four components (see also Bradford, 1995): (1) the opportu-
nity cost of capital (the return to waiting); (2) the expected risk premium
for investing (the return to risk-taking); (3) inframarginal returns to invest-
ing (what economists call "economic profit"), and (4) a remainder that
reflects realizations differing from expectation. For most investments, the
income tax basebut not the consumption tax baseincludes the first
component of capital income; both tax bases treat similarly the last three
components of capital income. Relative to an income tax, a consumption
tax exempts only the tax on the opportunity cost of capital.
Moving from the current U.S. tax base to a broad-based consumption
tax base encompasses two reforms: (1) a move from the current income tax
to a broad-based income tax with uniform capital taxation, and (2) a switch
from this pure income tax base to a consumption tax base. Short-run and
long-run distributional consequences of moving from the current tax sys-
tem to a consumption tax may differ in significant ways. In the short-run,
eliminating differential capital taxation would affect asset prices favoring
currently heavily-taxed assets (e.g., corporate capital) over lightly-taxed
assets (e.g., housing). The short-run effects of switching from an income
base to a consumption base may depend heavily on transition rules. TheDistribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax3
short-run distributional consequences of changes in asset prices depend
critically on the current pattern of wealth holding in the economy and the
horizon over which different people plan to hold their wealth.
In the long run, moving from the current income tax to an income tax
with uniform capital taxation does not necessarily change the average
level of capital taxation. However, depending on general equffibrium
effects, it may favor households that prefer goods produced with cur-
rently heavily-taxed assets. The second reformswitching from an in-
come tax with uniform capital taxation to a consumption taxreduces
the taxation of capital income. The long-run distributional effects of this
change depend on how after-tax rates of return change and, because not
all components of capital income benefit from tax reform, the distribu-
tion of the different components of capital income. A key question for
long-run distributional analysis is which savers get the opportunity cost
of capital as their rate of return and which savers receive higher returns.
For example, for a given level of wealth, investors whose returns mainly
consist of the opportunity cost of capital would benefit more than inves-
tors whose returns include returns to risk-taking or economic rents. In
addition, as a prototype for reform, the flatness of the Flat Tax of Hall
and Rabushka (1983, 1995)1 affects the distribution of after-tax earnings;
however, these effects are not specific to consumption taxes.
We identify basic sources of distributional change from fundamental
tax reform and offer descriptive statistics on the relative magnitudes of
these different sources. Our principal findings are three. First, the sub-
stantial observed heterogeneity in household portfolios implies that
eliminating differential capital taxation wifi differentially affect house-
holds; data from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances
suggest that even though middle-income and middle-net-worth house-
holds would bear some losses to the extent that house values decline,
overall losses in asset values are concentrated among high-income and
high-net-worth households. Second, we show that holdings of assets
1"Flat tax" proposals, generally modeled on Hall and Rabushka (1983, 1995), include those
by thenTreasury Secretary Nicholas Brady (1992) and Representative Richard Armey.
One could also consider a national retail sales tax, supported by, among others Representa-
tive Bill Archer and Senator Richard Lugar. Recent value-added tax proposals include the
plan by Representative Sam Gibbons to introduce a subtraction-method value-added tax in
the United States.
The Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) tax (described in Alliance USA, 1995), intro-
duced by Senators Pete Domenici and Sam Nunn in April 1995, proposes a proportional
tax on business value added. The individual level tax in the USA system is a "consumed
income tax" which excludes net saving from taxable income.
Not all recent proposals for fundamental tax reform have emphasized consumption
taxation; see, for example, the proposals for broad-based income tax reform in U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury (1992).4Gentry & Hubbard
most easily identified with inframarginal returns (active businesses) are
highly concentrated among high-income and high-net-worth house-
holds. This result suggests a more progressive distribution of the tax
change than that generated under the assumption that all capital income
represents opportunity cost. Our distributional analysis suggests that
this qualification is quantitatively important. Third, regarding the short-
run impact of switching tax bases, transition losses associated with hold-
ing basis in existing assets are concentrated among high-income and
high-net-worth households.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we compare
the taxation of capital under a pure income tax base and a pure con-
sumption tax. The following section identifies the basic factors that
determine the short-run and long-run distributional consequences. We
then examine the key incidence questions for eliminating differential
capital taxation followed by a discussion of the winners and losers in
the long run and in the short run from this reform. We then use recent
data on household asset holdings to suggest patterns of incidence of
the consumption tax relative to the income tax. Finally, we use this
information to guide the preparation of conventional "distribution ta-
bles." The last section concludes.
2. COMPARISON OF UNIFORM PURE INCOME AND
CONSUMPTION TAXES
2.1 What Are Income and Consumption Taxes?
It is useful to begin by comparing two hypothetical taxes: a pure
uniform-rate income tax and a subtraction-method value-added tax (or
combination of a wage tax and a business cash flow tax at the same rate).
A pure uniform-rate income tax has a base that includes all forms of
labor and capital income and a flat rate. This system would tax corporate
and noncorporate capital at the same total tax rate. One way to imple-
ment such an income tax would be to combine a business-level tax (for
both corporate and noncorporate firms) on receipts less wages, materials
costs, and capital depreciation with a household-level tax on wages. For
simplicity, suppose that business and household taxes are imposed at a
flat rate; the two tax rates are the same; no tax-favored ways of holding
wealth are available; and the economy is closed to capital flows. Abstract-
ing from risk considerations (see the discussion in section 2.4), the re-
vised income tax system, then, has three components: (1) a wage tax, (2)
a tax on returns from marginal investment projects, and (3) a cash flow
tax on returns from existing capital and inframarginal investment proj-Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax5
ects. Within the context of broad-based income tax reform, the U.S.
Treasury Department's (1992) Comprehensive Business Income Tax
(CBIT) proposal generally followed this model.
In a subtraction-method value-added tax (VAT), each business has a
tax base equal to the difference between receipts from sales of goods
and services and purchases of goods and services from other busi-
nesses. This measure of value added is then taxed at a fixed tax rate.
Transactions among businesses generate offsetting increases in the tax
base of sellers and decreases in the tax base of buyers, so that no net
revenue accrues to the government. Net revenue arises when goods are
sold by a business to a non-business entity, generally households. Be-
cause the aggregate business tax base equals the aggregate sales by
businesses to non-businesses, the tax base is equivalent to aggregate
consumption. As long as tax rates are uniform, this subtraction-method
value-added tax is equivalent to the familiar European-style credit-
invoice value-added tax.
For a uniform tax, we could equivalently allow a deduction for wages at
the business level with wage taxation at the same rate for individuals (as in
the HallRabushka Flat Tax). Thus the subtraction-method VAT can be
thought of as a combination of a wage tax and a tax on business cash flow.
With this alternative means of administration, the consumption tax looks
strikingly similar to the hypothetical income tax. The difference between
the two taxes is that the income tax base depreciates capital expenditures
but the consumption tax base deducts capital outlays.
2.2 Single Riskiess Returns to Capital: What Is Taxed?
Traditional descriptions of the taxation of capital income under a cash
flow tax or consumption tax assume that all income from capital is ex-
empt. To explain this view, assume that investment projects offer a
single riskiess rate of return. We can then decompose the base of the Flat
Tax into two parts: the first is a business cash flow tax whose base is R -
I, where R is receipts from sales of goods and services less purchases for
labor, raw materials, and services, and I is expenditure on capital
goods.3 The second is a wage tax, whose base is wages, W. (The
subtraction-method VAT combines the two pieces, with a base equal to
R + W - I.) While the wage tax burden is borne by labor, how should we
think about the burden of the cash flow tax?
2This argument is an old one, tracing its roots to John Stuart Mill's evaluation of capital
income taxation as inherently representing double taxation (see Mill, 1895, Book V, Chap-
ter II). A similar argument appears in Musgrave (1959).6Gentry & Hubbard
Under the cash flow tax, the user cost of capital is independent of tax
parameters. In this case, the present value of one dollar's worth of
depreciation deductions is one dollar, while the present value is less
than one dollar under the income tax. The present value of depreciation
allowances depends on the depreciation schedule prescribed by the tax
code for the firm's assets and the discount rate which the firm uses to
discount the future tax savings from the depreciation allowances. Hypo-
thetically, depreciation schedules reflect the useful life of different as-
sets. For the case of a riskless investment project, the tax savings from
depreciation allowances represent riskless cash flows which the firm
would discount at the safe (nominal) rate of interest.
For a marginal investmentone in which the expected rate of return
just equals the interest ratethe upfront subsidy to investment pro-
vided by expensing just equals the expected future tax payments. In this
sense, the return to capital is not taxed under the cash flow tax (or,
equivalently, under the consumption tax).
2.3 Inframarginal Returns: What Is Taxed?
The foregoing example assumed a single riskiess return available on
investment projects. Now suppose that, in addition to having access to
riskiess investments, certain entrepreneurs have access to investments
with inframarginal returns. Such returns are associated with rents to
ideas, managerial skill, or market power. By construction, the scale of
these projects or opportunities is limited.
Extending the first example, what is taxed are rates of cash flow in
excess of the firm's discount rate for depreciation allowances (the
riskiess rate of return under our hypothetical tax systems). Cash flows
representing inframarginal returns are taxed equivalently under the
broad-based income tax and the cash flow tax (or consumption tax). As
long as the scale of inframarginal projects is limited and entrepreneurs'
project selection is optimal,4 the tax savings from expensing should be
invested in another riskiess asset. For the case of inframarginal projects,
then, only the component of the return representing the riskiess rate is
untaxed under the cash flow tax (or consumption tax).
The business cash flow tax has a long pedigree among economists seeking to apply
consumption tax principles to business taxation. An early exposition appears in Brown
(1948); implementation issues are discussed in King (1975), Institute for Fiscal Studies
(1978), Aaron and Galper (1985), and Hubbard (1989).
If entrepreneurs face financing constraints, they may underinvest in the project that
yields inframarginal returns. In this case, the firm's tax savings from expensing may be
invested in the inframarginal project.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax7
2.4 Risky Investments: What Is Taxed?
Thus far, we have abstracted from risk in project returns. Introducing
risk adds two complications. First, risky investments have a higher ex
ante required rate of return than riskiess investments, reflecting a risk
premium to compensate savers for bearing risk. Second, risky invest-
ments generate ex post high or low returns to investing. When we
look at the distribution of capital income across households, some
variation reflects this ex post good or bad fortune. The component of
capital income that represents luck after a risky investment decision
has been made can be treated like the inframarginal return in our
hypothetical income tax and cash flow tax. Ex post returns in excess of
the ex ante expected return are taxed under both the income tax and
the cash flow tax; assuming similar loss offset provisions, low ex post
returns also generate the same tax consequences under the two
systems.
Whether either tax system levies a tax on the ex ante risk premium
depends upon how one defines a "tax." If a tax is defined as an in-
crease in expected government revenues, then both the income tax and
the cash flow tax include the ex ante risk premium; if, in contrast, a tax
is an increase in the discounted present value of government revenues,
then neither tax system includes the ex ante risk premium. This distinc-
tion is most easily seen for a cash flow tax with full loss offsets. By
levying such a tax, the government shares equally in the costs and
rever.ies of investment projects; this feature of the tax system leads to
the analogy of the government as a "silent partner" in the investment.
Suppose that the government taxes two projects with the same costs
but with different expected returns (because one project is riskier than
the other). Neither project has expected inframarginal returns. As do
private investors, the government would expect a higher return on its
investment (cost-sharing) in the riskier project. However, assuming
that expected returns compensate for risk, the "market value" of this
extra expected revenue would be zero because it compensates the gov-
ernment for the added riskiness of the revenue stream; that is, the
government does not increase the discounted present value of its reve-
nue by taxing pure risk.5
One can argue that, absent capital-market imperfections, the government cannot bear
systematic risk beyond that obtained in market outcomes (see, e.g., Bulow and Summers,
1984, and Gordon, 1985). Our point is simply that, for a given level of systematic risk the
government can bear the risk in both income and consumption taxes. Hence the experi-
ment we consider still permits an analysis of differential tax incidence.8Gentry & Hubbard
In contrast to the cash flow tax, an income tax provides depreciation
allowances rather than expensing for capital purchases. This difference
does not affect the treatment of the uncertainty about costs and revenues
as long as the two tax systems have similar loss offset provisions. By
providing depreciation allowances rather than expensing, the govern-
ment pays a smaller share of the cost of investment projects because the
investor recoups the government's "share" of the cost in the future
rather than at the time of the outlay. The present value of the loss to the
investor (and, conversely, the gain to the government) depends on how
the tax savings from depreciation allowances should be discounted. Un-
der the assumption of full loss offsets and constant tax rates under both
tax systems, the government's promise of depreciation allowances gives
the investor a safe, predictable cash flow which warrants discounting at
the default-risk-free rate of return.
Our analysis is not really at odds with Kaplow's (1994) arguments that
an income tax is equivalent to a wage tax plus an ex ante wealth tax and
that a consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax; the apparent differ-
ence arises from Kaplow's assumptions about the government's portfo-
lio behavior.6 Kaplow concludes that neither an income tax nor consump-
tion tax taxes risk because the government offsets the effects of both
taxes on the uncertainty of government revenue by decreasing its posi-
tion in risky assets and increasing its position in safe assets. In Kaplow's
model, the government can achieve the same effect as a tax on risk by in
effect swapping safe assets for risky assets (which Kaplow argues is not a
tax). Such a swap would increase the government's expected revenue
(provided the expected return on risky assets exceeds the safe rate of
return) but does not increase the current value of the government's
portfolio (that is, the transaction generates a zero market value in an
efficient financial market). In comparing a switch between the two tax
systemsholding the tax rate constantthe government portfolio rebal-
ancing of Kaplow's framework is unnecessary since both tax bases in-
clude the return to risk-taking.7
In either case, the key point for our analysis is that the stylized income
and consumption tax bases treat both the ex ante and ex post components
6Warren (1996) and Zodrow (1995) also discuss the relative treatment of risk under alterna-
tive tax bases.
Both our setup and that of Kaplow are obviously highly stylized. The treatment of the
risk premium under an income tax or under a consumption tax will differ from what is
suggested in these setups if borrowing or short-sale restrictions are present, if loss offsets
are not perfect, and if tax rates change over time. It is not obvious, however, that these
modifications would affect the equivalence of the tax on the risk premium under the two
systems.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax 9
of the return to risk-taking similarly. Because traditional ex post distribu-
tional analysis includes the returns to risk-taking in household income
and the consumption purchased from such returns (which is relevant,
for example, for analyses that distribute consumption tax burdens in
accordance with consumption), our distributional analysis assumes that
the income and consumption tax bases include the returns to risk-
taking. That is, we allocate taxes based on the distribution of either
expected or realized income.
This analysis suggests the income and consumption tax bases are simi-
lar with respect to the returns to risk-taking, while conventional treat-
ments (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987) claim that a consumption tax
is equivalent to a wage tax plus a tax on the value of old capital.8 Relative
to an analysis assuming a consumption tax is borne in proportion to
wage income and ownership of "old" capital, the inclusion of the returns
to risk-taking imply that households with relatively more risky assets
will bear more of the consumption tax. If attitudes toward risk vary
across income or wealth groups, then including the return to risk-taking
in the consumption tax base can affect the distribution of taxes across
income or net worth classes.
Putting our arguments together, what is often called the return to
capital can be thought of as the sum of the riskless return (opportunity
cost, or return to waiting), inframarginal returns (economic profits), or
ex ante risk premium on risky investments (payment for bearing risk) and
ex post realizations on risky investments (luck). Unlike the consumption
tax base, the income tax base includes the opportunity cost of capital,
which equals the rate of return on a marginal riskiess project. Assuming
the consumption tax does not change the rate of return on investment,
for investments with the same opportunity cost, the owner of the invest-
ment with a high rate of return will pay more in taxes than the owner of
the investment with a lower rate of return. Because households that save
benefit from eliminating the tax on the opportunity cost of capital, they
benefit from this tax reform. However, because inframarginal returns to
saving are stifi taxed, the distributional effects also depend on separating
"opportunity cost" returns to saving from inframarginal returns and
returns to risk-taking.
The equivalence in the conventional view is true for analyzing the present value of
government revenues provided the government discounts the uncertain revenues gener-
ated by a consumption tax at the risky market-determined rate of return (see Zodrow,
1995). However, distributional analysis is typically done on the basis of realized outcomes.
From this perspective, two investors with identical wage income but different portfolios
will have different tax liabilities under either an income tax or a consumption tax but not
under a wage tax.10Gentry & Hubbard
3. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF SHIFTING
THE TAX BASE FROM INCOME TO CONSUMPTION
3.1 Who Benefits in the Long Run?: Implications from
a Life-Cycle Model
In replacing a pure income tax with a pure consumption tax, the long-
run distributional effects depend on what happens to the amount that
individuals save (and the timing of their saving) throughout their life-
time and to the after-tax return to saving. To fix ideas for the first
issue, we use the familiar life-cycle model. In the simplest version
with representative agents for each cohort and perfect lending and
insurance markets, capital income is earned from the accumulated
stock of savings, and saving occurs to finance future consumption for
the individual. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption is high, a switch from an income tax to a consumption tax
generates a large saving response, and the higher capital stock makes
future generations better off (see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987).
In a closed economy with uniform taxation of all capital income, this
saving response is the only source of funds for increasing the capital
stock.
The simplest life-cycle story is not easily transferred to the distribu-
tional analysis considered by tax policymakers, who are concerned as
much with intragenerational as intergenerational comparisons of eco-
nomic well-being. This concerns does not imply that the life-cycle
model's guidance is not useful, however. An expanded life-cycle frame-
work can consider several major sources of heterogeneity in household
saving propensities. These sources include differences in the level of
lifetime income, the timing of the receipt of income, and differences in
households' terms of trade in lending and insurance markets (see, e.g.,
Fullerton and Rogers, 1993, and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994,
1995).
3.2 Who Benefits or Loses in the Short Run?: Transition Issues
A major focus of political discussion of the incidence of a consumption
tax relates to transitional redistributions accompanying a switch from an
income tax to a consumption tax. In the life-cycle framework, part of the
steady-state gain in welfare accompanying the tax reform is accounted
for by a transition tax, borne disproportionately by the elderly in the
conventional life-cycle setting. The elderly accumulate assets to finance
retirement consumption under the income tax regime; now they must
pay tax again on those funds as they are used to purchase goods andDistribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax11
services. The extent to which the elderly bear this tax depends on the
change in the after-tax price of consumption from switching tax bases. In
part, the after-tax price of consumption depends on the general price
level effects of tax reform which, in turn, may depend on the admirdstra-
tion of tax reform. If the transition tax comes only from disallowing
depreciation allowances and not from a one-time increase in the price
level, then the elderly bear the tax only to the extent they own a dispro-
portionately large share of that lose their depreciation allowances. There
is another significant consideration, however: Consumption taxes offer
higher expected future after-tax returns to saving. Hence, to the extent
that the transition tax is borne by individuals with relatively long future
consumption horizons, the consumption tax may make better off even
households bearing the transition tax. However, decomposing capital
income into its components suggests that the higher expected future
(after-tax) returns to saving applies only to opportunity cost returns.
4. ELIMINATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION
OF CAPITAL INCOME
The broad-based income tax assumed by the preceding section bears
only a faint resemblance to the current U.S. tax system. An important
difference between the two is the current system's differential taxation
of capital income. Most prominent is the double taxation of equity-
financed corporate investment created by having a separate corporate
income tax. Moreover, variation in the generosity of depreciation allow-
ances across assets generates differences in the effective tax rates across
investments. In addition to the corporate tax, many provisions of the
individual tax code also produce differential taxation, such as differential
tax rates on capital gains and dividends, the non-taxation of the implicit
returns from consumer durables, exemption from tax of interest on state
and local government bonds, and various provisions to encourage retire-
ment saving.
While this differential taxation can affect the relative pretax returns to
various investments, general equilibrium analysis suggests that it can
also affect the overall return to saving. For example, the current U.S.
income tax can be thought of as the combination of a wage tax, a tax on
the capital income of bondholders and shareholders, and a surtax on
capital income generated by equity capital invested in the corporate
sector. It is reasonable to assign the burden of the wage tax to labor
income and the burden of general capital income taxes to capital income.
Since Harberger's (1962) seminal analysis, most economists have argued
that, under reasonable specifications of production technology and pref-12Gentry & Hubbard
erences, the corporation tax is borne by owners of capital in general, and
not only by the shareholders of corporations.9'1°
Again, a consumption tax is only one method of uniform capital in-
come taxation. Such taxation can also be achieved by reforming the
income tax system; for example, the Treasury Department's Comprehen-
sive Business Income Tax (CBIT) proposal eliminated most of the main
forms of differential capital taxation. Thus the distributional issues asso-
ciated with eliminating differential taxation are not unique to a consump-
tion tax but can apply to income tax reform.
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ELIMINATING DIFFERENTIAL CAPITAL TAXATION
5.1 Relative Winners and Losers in the Short Run
Starting with differential capital taxation instead of uniform capital taxa-
tion changes the distributional consequences of moving to a consump-
tion tax if individuals do not hold the same portfolio of assets. If all
individuals own the same assets, but the scale of portfolios depends on
the level of saving, then the distributional implications of starting from
differential capital taxation would be small. However, the composition
of household portfolios varies considerably, so that eliminating differen-
tial capital taxation will not have uniform effects across households.
Moving from differential capital taxation to uniform capital taxation
(including a consumption tax) would lower the price of currently tax-
favored assets relative to more heavily-taxed assets. Thus capitalizing
effects of the reform, the prices of houses and tax-exempt bonds wifi fall
relative to corporate equity, and investors with portfolios concentrated
in these assets will suffer transitional losses. For equities, the conse-
quences of eliminating the income tax depend on a number of consider-
ations, as we describe in the Appendix (in which we review potential
asset price effects of tax reform). For debt, the removal of the income tax
wifi lead interest rates to be equated with the after-tax return on invest-
ment (adjusted for risk). Under the income tax, interest is deductible by
business borrowers and taxed for recipients, leading the interest rate to
be equated with the before-tax return on investment.
The actual corporate "income" tax is a combination of an income tax and a consumption
tax (see, e.g., Auten and Kalambokidis, 1995)
10The Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis uses this assumption, for example, in
the preparation of distributional analysis. The Congressional Budget Office generally as-
sumes that half of the corporate tax is borne by capital income and half by labor income.
The Joint Committee on Taxation does not distribute the burden of the corporate tax.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax13
5.2 Relative Winners and Losers in the Long Run
To a large extent, the short-run incidence of eliminating differential capi-
tal taxation depends on the pattern of existing asset holdings. In the long
run, however, asset prices and portfolio holdings will adjust to the new
tax rules; thus the initial pattern of asset holdings (the sources of income)
is irrelevant for long-run incidence. In contrast, the sources of income
are relevant for the long-run incidence of moving from a pure income to
a pure consumption tax. However, instead of being determined by the
sources of income, the long-run distributional consequences of eliminat-
ing differential taxation depend on the uses of income. Does differential
capital taxation change the relative prices of consumption goods? If the
answer is yes, then the distribution of the tax varies according to varia-
tion in consumers' preferences. If consumption bundles are relatively
similar across households, then the long-run equity consequences of
eliminating differential capital taxation would be small. As an example,
consider how eliminating differential capital taxation affects housing.
Because the reform is likely to raise the relative cost of housing (both
owner-occupied and rental), households with a relative preference for
housing would bear more of the long-run burden of tax reform than
households that consume less housing.
In addition to these general equilibrium distributional effects, eliminat-
ing differential capital taxation can affect long-run progressivity by elimi-
nating the incentives that investors have to engage in tax avoidance
through adjusting the composition of assets in their portfolios. For exam-
ple, under current tax rules, investors facing high tax rates have an
incentive to invest in tax-favored assets, such as tax-exempt bonds. To
the degree that investors respond to these incentives, such portfolio
behavior can undermine the statutory progressivity embedded in gradu-
ated income tax rates.11
Differential taxation in the current tax system also provides some inves-
tors with opportunities to engage in "tax arbitrage." Tax arbitrage is ac-
complished by borrowing with tax-deductible interest payments to buy
tax-favored assets. Examples include borrowing to finance deductible
contributions to retirement savings and holding a larger-than-necessary
mortgage on one's home (see, e.g., Scholz, 1994, and Engen and Gale,
1995). The extent to which households engage in tax arbitrage obviously
varies considerably across households, with high-income households
11Hubbard (1985), Scholz (1994), and Poterba and Samwick (1996) present evidence on
how portfolio shares very with tax rates, much of which is consistent with theories that
taxes affect portfolio allocation.14Gentry & Hubbard
having the largest incentives to undertake this behavior by virtue of their
higher marginal tax rates. To the extent that increased uniformity of the
taxation of various capital-market transactions reduces the amount of tax-
motivated portfolio reshufifing and tax arbitrage, the move to a consump-
tion tax will mitigate any inequities associated with differential use of
these strategies. The simple story is that, by reducing the number of tax
"loopholes," a consumption tax places a relatively high burden on house-
holds that would have used the loopholes. For example, to the extent that
very high-income or high-net-worth households currently use available
tax-minimizing strategies, the combination of the exemption of the oppor-
tunity cost of capital from taxation and the elimination of tax arbitrage
under the consumption tax may even increase progressivity.
6. ROLE OF HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The short-run gains and losses from tax reform depend on who bears
any transition taxthe tax on pre-reform basisand asset price effects
from the reform. Hence the distribution of short-run gains and losses
depends on the distribution of asset holdings and liabilities across the
population. The pattern of a8set holdings and liabilities is also important
for the long-term distributional consequences of tax reform either if
some assets are more likely than others to generate positive net present
value or if differences in portfolio composition reflect heterogeneity in
consumer preferences (e.g., a preference for housing). Also, current
portfolio decisions affect the long-run distributional effects of tax reform
if household portfolios reflect different amounts of tax avoidance behav-
ior that will be eliminated by tax reform.
As we noted earlier, households are likely to differ in their portfolio
choices. We explore this heterogeneity in portfolio composition with
data from the Federal Reserve's 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), a sample of 3,143 households with an overrepresentation of
wealthy households.'2 We use sampling weights so our tables have esti-
mates for the overall U.S. population. As an overview of household
portfolio choices, Table 1 presents these summary statistics on house-
12We use 1989 data, rather than the more recent 1992 data, because in several instances we
use information on the book value of active business assets owned by households which was
included in the 1989 SCF but not the 1992 SCF. While along many dimensions the 1989 and
1992 data are similar, Poterba and Samwick (1995, PP. 328-331) discuss some apparent
differences. Relative to the 1992 data, the 1989 data indicate that net worth and equity
ownership are more concentrated at the very top of the net worth distribution. These
differences may suggest that even with oversampling of wealthy households the SCF totals
are sensitive to outliers or that the distribution of some assets can fluctuate in the short run.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax15
TABLE 1
Overall Household Portfolio Characteristics
Note:
Liquid assets mdude checking, savings, and money market accounts.
Taxable bonds include direct and mutual fund holdings as well as savings bonds.
Tax-exempt bonds include direct and mutual fund holdings.
Retirement accounts include IRAs, Keoghs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and similar plans.
Miscellaneous financial assets include annuities, whole life insurance, trusts, and other.
Real estate indudes investment properties and second homes.
Active business implies an active management role.
Other real assets include vehicles, real personal property, and miscellaneous items.
Mortgage debt includes all debt secured by the primary residence.
Portfolio shares are the ratio of the value of the asset to the aggregate value of all assets.
All dollar figures are in 1989 dollars.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1989 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
hold holdings of various assets (or liabilities): (1) the percentage of house-
holds with each asset; (2) the median and mean asset holding among
households with each asset; and (3) the aggregate portfolio share (ratio
of aggregate asset value for each asset to the value of total household
assets). Our asset categories are: liquid assets, certificates of deposit
(CDs), taxable bonds, tax-exempt bonds, direct holdings of corporate
equity, mutual fund holdings of corporate equity, retirement accounts,13
13While the SCE contains information on defined benefit pensions, we exclude this infor-
mation in our tabulations. Imputing pension wealth requires a complicated and, to some
extent, arbitrary set of assumptions. In addition, because the taxation of this wealth would
not be significantly changed by the proposed reforms, we emphasize assets over which











Liquid assets 84.9 2.1 15.0 1,182 5.9
CDs 19.4 12.0 31.4 570 2.9
Taxable bonds 27.8 1.0 16.1 416 2.1
Tax-exempt bonds 4.5 23.0 124.6 522 2.6
Stock, direct 16.1 7.0 53.8 806 4.0
Stock, mutual funds 5.8 7.0 23.7 128 0.6
Retirement accounts 35.2 10.0 31.6 1,034 5.2
Misc. financial assets 44.4 4.0 26.5 1,094 5.5
Primary residence 62.7 70.0 105.0 6,131 30.8
Real estate 20.0 42.8 159.7 2,973 14.9
Active business 10.0 60.0 375.3 3,492 17.5
Passive business 2.8 35.0 162.5 429 2.2
Other real assets 84.1 7.9 14.5 1,136 5.7
Mortgage debt 39.3 35.0 47.6 1,746 8.8
Other debt 66.9 5.7 21.5 1,339 6.716Gentry & Hubbard
miscellaneous financial assets, primary residences, other real estate, ac-
five businesses (in which the household has an active management
role), passive businesses (e.g., limited partnership interests), other real
assets, mortgage debt, and other debt. These categories reflect differ-
ences among assets relevant for assessing the effects of tax reform.
The first column of Table 1 confirms the suspected heterogeneity of
household portfolios. Only liquid assets, houses, and other real assets
(primarily vehicles) appear in the portfolios of more than half of the house-
holds. Many of the other assets appear in the portfolios of a minority of
households. For example, only ten percent of households have any active
business assets and fewer than a fifth of households directly own corpo-
rate equity. The aggregate portfolio shares in the last column of Table 1
indicate that, even without accounting for defined benefit pension plans,
a substantial portion of household wealth is held in currently tax-favored
forms, such as housing (30.8 percent of the aggregate portfolio), retire-
ment accounts (5.2 percent), and tax-exempt bonds (2.6 percent).
In Tables 2-4, we present the distribution of assets and liabilities
across household groups by age, net worth, and current income. These
tables provide information on how the short-run and long-run gains and
losses from tax reform will be distributed across broad classes within the
economy. While these tables provide information on intergenerational
distribution or vertical equity, they are silent on possible horizontal eq-
uity differences within groups.
6.1 Distribution by Age Cohort
In Table 2, we classify households by the age of the head of household.
The "young" group is the 30 percent of the population in which the head
of household is 35 years old or younger. The "middle-aged" group has
the 35 percent of the population in which the head of household is
between the ages of 36 and 54. The "old" group of households has a
head at least 55 years old. Knowledge of the distribution of current
wealth holdings across age groups guides understanding the distribu-
tion of transition gains or losses from tax reform because the transition
effects depend on who owns which assets. By contrast, the distribution
of assets by age is not very informative for understanding the long-run
distributional implications of tax reform because, over a lifetime, every-
one progresses through the age distribution.
The traditional life-cycle model suggests that older households bear
most of the transition tax on existing wealth, because the model predicts
that they own most of the current capital stock. In fact, households over
age 55 own just over half (51.7 percent) of the total household net worth.
Because much of the current wealth is held by households with headsDistribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax17
TABLE 2
Distribution of Assets by Age
Note: The entries are the percent of each asset or liability owned by each age group.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1989 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
under age 55, a large fraction of any transition tax on existing wealth
may be offset by higher after-tax rates of return compounded until youn-
ger or middle-aged households dissave. Furthermore, for unrealized
capital gains, moving to a consumption tax in the traditional life-cycle
model would not create an extra tax burden since these gains would
already be subject to the income tax; that is, the transition tax only
applies to the tax basis of the assets. For active businesses and direct
holdings of corporate equity, the elderly's share of tax basis is less than
their share of asset value. Thus, not surprisingly, older households hold
a larger fraction of untaxed accrued capital gains than other generations.
If the price level does not change in response to tax reform, older house-
holds receive a disproportionately large share of this windfall depending
on how much future tax would have been paid on these accrued gains.
In terms of the relative asset price effects across cohorts, older house-
holds own a disproportionately large share of financial assets. Hence the
Young Middle-aged Old
Assets
Liquid assets + CDs 6.85 25.79 67.36
Taxable bonds 3.87 21.49 74.64
Tax-exempt bonds 1.38 19.58 79.04
Stock, direct 7.05 26.67 66.27
Stock, mutual funds 1.13 36.17 62.70
Retirement accounts 7.55 48.42 44.03
Misc. financial assets 16.12 37.73 46.15
Primary residence 15.86 45.06 39.07
Real estate 4.95 47.37 47.68
Active business 14.56 44.49 40.95
Passive business 7.25 45.95 46.80
Other real assets 19.11 49.52 31.37
Liabilities
Mortgage debt 31.65 54.62 13.73
Other debt 15.58 58.64 25.78
Other statistics
Net worth 9.34 39.00 51.66
Housing equity 9.58 41.26 49.16
Basis of direct equity 8.03 27.75 64.22
Basis of active business 11.83 53.96 34.2118Gentry & Hubbard
value of portfolios held by the elderly bear relatively more of the changes
in financial asset prices than other age groups. Corporate equity values
can change for two reasons: (1) the disallowance of expected deprecia-
tion allowances has a negative effect on the value of existing capital; and
(2) the repeal of the double tax on corporate dividends could cause
equity prices to increase. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these
effects, the elderly could either gain or lose. For tax-exempt bonds, the
elderly would bear the brunt of any negative asset price effects for tax-
exempt bonds. However, to translate these asset price effects into
changes in consumption (as opposed to changes in either intended or
unintended bequests), one must know whether investors plan to con-
sume from the income produced by their portfolios or sell the assets for
consumption. For example, if tax reform does not change the after-tax
coupons from tax-exempt bonds, older households suffer a loss in after-
tax consumption only if they sell the bonds for a capital loss (assuming a
small price level effect). In terms of housing, the middle-aged cohort
owns 45 percent of housing value and 41 percent of housing equity (the
difference generated by the elderly borrowing less than younger fami-
lies); thus middle-aged households stand to lose the most from a de-
crease in the relative price of housing.
To summarize, Table 2 suggests that, even without specific rules de-
signed to mitigate transition losses, transition losses from tax reform will
not be concentrated solely on older households.
6.2 Distribution by Net Worth Class
Table 3 presents the distribution of asset holdings by net worth class.
Because much of the interesting variation in portfolio composition oc-
curs among wealthier households, we present statistics for relatively
fine groupings at the top of the weallh distribution. For our short-run
analysis, the current distribution of assets provides information on
whether relatively wealthy households bear less of the burden caused by
the transition to a consumption tax. If tax reform does not fundamen-
tally change portfolio composition across wealth groups,14 this distribu-
tion also provides information on the long-run effects of tax reform if tax
reform has differential effects on rates of return across asset types.
If either the transition tax on existing wealth were distributed uni-
formly across assets or portfolio shares were constant across wealth
groups, then the rich would certainly bear more of the tax: households in
14This is an unrealistic assumption for asset choices that are driven primarily by the tax
code. For example, the concentration of tax-exempt bonds among wealthy households is
unlikely to survive a tax reform that eliminates the high-income-tax-rate clientele for tax-
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Assets by Net Worth
Note: Wealth is defined as total assets less total liabilities (net worth). It excludes pension and Soda! Security
wealth. The entries are the percentage of each asset or liability owned by each net worth group.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1989 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
the top 5 percent of the net worth distribution have 57 percent of the net
worth. However, the rich are not like everyone else-their ownership in
different assets varies considerably from their proportion of household
wealth. For example, they own 86 percent of tax-exempt bonds (a rela-
five loser under tax reform), over 70 percent of corporate equity owned
by households (ambiguous as a winner or loser), 64 percent of the tax
basis in active business assets (a relative loser under proposals that





Liquid assets + CDs 5.5213.1420.6813.5720.1126.98
Taxable bonds 1.705.9812.3111.2219.6849.10
Tax-exempt bonds 0.300.65 4.59 8.9022.5563.00
Stock, direct 1.483.3512.95 9.8928.7943.54
Stock, mutual funds 1.845.7711.2311.0139.2530.90
Retirement accounts 3.7811.9527.7317.4623.3115.78
Misc. financial assets 4.7010.3314.2711.0820.0639.57
Primary residence 9.3227.6327.8012.6715.22 7.36
Real estate 2.484.9312.13 9.3629.9541.14
Active business 0.312.675.14 8.0522.5661.27
Passive business 0.43 3.016.99 4.9320.4864.16
Other real assets 17.8721.8917.4610.3320.0430.59
Liabilities




Housing equity 5.6525.2629.2013.8117.26 8.83
Basis of direct equity 2.11 3.6614.4510.2626.9442.58
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relative to other assets), but only 23 percent of primary residences (a
relative loser). While the burden of the fall in housing values relative to
other capital would be distributed more evenly across net worth groups
than other short-run effects of tax reform, even this component of the
transition burden falls heavily on the top of the net worth distribution
since the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution has 40 percent of total
housing equity. To the extent that the transition to a consumption tax
would levy a burden on the owners of existing capital, Table 3 confirms
what could be labeled the "Willie Sutton" hypothesis of transition inci-
dence: wealthy households bear a tax on the components of old capital
affected by the reform because those households own most of the
wealth.
6.3 Distribution by Current Annual Income
In Table 4, we present the same statistics as in Table 3, with households
sorted by annual self-reported income rather than wealth. Because the
correlation between net worth and annual income among the SCF house-
holds is only 0.26, Table 4 potentially suggests a different distributional
pattern than Table 315 Annual income is an alternative to net worth as a
measure of current "ability to pay" taxes. Neither table perfectly mea-
sures either current or lifetime ability to pay taxes given the pattern of
income and wealth over the life cycle. Misclassifications are most likely
for old and young households. For example, some "middle-class" retired
households may have a relatively low current income, but relatively high
net worth; the income table would classify these households as relatively
poor, while the net worth table would place them among the rich.
As expected, a comparison of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that net worth is
less concentrated among high-income households than it is among high-
net-worth households. The top 5 percent of households in the income
distribution owns 43 percent of the net worth, compared to the 57 percent
of the net worth held by the top 5 percent of the net worth distribution.
While this difference in concentration holds for each asset, the size varies
across assets. Relative to the bottom half of the net worth distribution,the
bottom half of the income distribution owns much more of the liquid
assets (25 percent to 6 percent), active business assets (12.6 percent to 0.3
percent), and housing equity (24 percent to 6 percent). Households that
are in the bottom half of the income distribution but not the bottomhalf of
net worth distribution can be considered "low-income-but-high-net-
worth" households. One explanation for the change in the concentration
'The correlation is 0.41 within the young age group, 0.27 within the middle-aged group,
and 0.43 within the oldest group.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax21
TABLE 4
Distribution of Assets by Current Income
Note: The entries are the percent of each asset or liability owned by each income group.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1989 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
of liquid assets is that these low-income-but-high-net-worth households
have a high demand for liquidity in order to spend out of wealth. The shift
in business assets suggests that some small businesses generate (or re-
port) low income. The shift in housing equity probably reflects older
families in the low-income-but-high-net-worth group that do not have
mortgages.
Explanations for why a household's rank in the net worth distribution
differs from its rank in the income distribution could have important





Liquid assets + CDs 25.1119.0514.38 9.7916.4315.23
Taxable bonds 10.8919.5011.36 9.50 9.04 39.71.
Tax-exempt bonds 3.57 8.484.3314.0820.2449.30
Stock, direct 5.9811.5812.54 9.5624.5035.84
Stock, mutual funds 4.9010.4014.9912.3626.9730.37
Retirement accounts 6.1316.9523.2816.8021.23 15.61
Misc. financial assets 10.5216.5014.9815.6416.8325.52
Primary residence 20.4923.0422.7612.6613.61 7.45
Real estate 6.8511.0914.8210.8625.7030.68
Active business 12.638.89 9.45 5.2217.9245.89
Passive business 8.9016.21 8.03 8.2217.1741.46
Other real assets 19.1120.7121.14 9.3411.7018.00
Liabilities
Mortgage debt 11.3523.0228.3716.4114.70 6.16
Other debt 11.0416.4915.65 9.9223.2723.64
Other Statistics
Net worth 15.1415.7815.3510.2617.4126.07
Housing equity 24.1323.0420.5211.1713.17 7.96
Basis of direct equity 7.0310.1514.62 9.1823.3535.68
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ability to pay. For example, because only 4.6 percent of households in
the bottom half of the income distribution own noncorporate business
assets, the transition losses associated with disallowing depreciation of
existing basis could fall on a small number of households whose annual
income is not very high. Of course, under the current tax system a
household with a small business but low annual income does not reap
much benefit from the existing depreciation allowances because having
a low income implies a low marginal tax rate. Withprogressive tax rates,
this transition loss is, then, smaller for those households than for high-
income households.
Overall, the concentration of net worth among high-income families
(albeit weaker than the concentration among high-net-worth families)
suggests that any short-run tax on existing wealth would appear quite
progressive (or, any short-run forgiveness of anticipated taxes on in-
come from existing assets would be regressive).
6.4 Distribution of Inframarginal Returns
As discussed earlier, the difference between the Comprehensive Busi-
ness Income Tax (as a representative fundamental income taxreform)
and the Flat Tax (as a representative fundamental consumption tax re-
form) lies in their treatment of the opportunity cost of capital. Both tax
bases include returns in excess of the opportunity cost of capital. How-
ever, CBIT taxes the opportunity cost of capital, while the Flat Tax does
not. Hence one way of capturing the long-run distributional differences
between the two proposals is to examine the distribution of marginal
projects. That is, among households that save, relative to CBIT a con-
sumption tax favors households that invest through marginal projects.
Inframarginal projects are likely to be concentrated in holdings of active
businesses, assets which are overwhelmingly concentrated among the
top of the wealth distribution (the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution
owns 84 percent of active business interests).16 To the extent thatmiddle
and upper-middle groups in the net worth distribution generate most of
their returns through marginal projects and own relatively few assets
with potential inframarginal returns, they would benefit relatively more
from removing the opportunity cost of capital from the tax base. The rich
would, of course, also benefit from this reform, but they would still pay
taxes on their economic profit. While an accurate division of capital in-
16Publicly traded corporations may also have mframargirial projects. However, the ex-
pected future value of these inframarginal returns is capitalized into share prices when
investors buy equity. Thus a portion of these returns would accrue to the company found-
ers. Subsequent "discoveries" of inframarginal projects by the corporation wouldaffect
such equity returns as ex post good luck.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax23
come into "opportunity cost" and "economic profit" would require intri-
cate calculations (based on information beyond that in available data), our
conclusion coincides with the intuition that households get rich by having
good ideas (or good luck) rather than by clipping bond coupons.
The question of which households would benefit from repealing the tax
on the opportunity cost of capital by moving from a broad-based income
tax to a consumption tax remains. One could consider more precisely the
distribution of inframarginal projects among households if it were possi-
ble to measure differences in households' average q, the ratio of the mar-
ket value of an asset to its replacement cost. A high value of q reflects
inframarginal returns to ideas, patents, or market power. If one could
calculate q values for household businesses, it would be possible to investi-
gate whether inframarginal projects are concentrated among high-income
or high-net-worth households.
We construct average q proxies for active business holdings by house-
holds in the SCF. The survey asks detailed questions on up to three
active businesses for each household; remaining active business assets
are lumped together. In order to have data on both the market value and
book value of assets, we are limited to using only the separately listed
businesses for each household. To avoid outliers in the construction of
average q, we limit the sample to households who own interests in active
businesses with at least $1,000 of book value. To calculate average q, we
divide the sum of the household's market value of different active busi-
nesses by its share of these firms' book value.
Table 5 reports median q values for the sample as a whole, by net
worth class, by current income class, and by age group.17 For both net
worth and current income groupings, median q values are substantially
higher in the top 5 percent of the respective distributions.18 This varia-
tion does not reflect just differences in the age of the business owner;
median q values do not vary much across the youngest, middle, and
oldest age groupings. While these calculations must be interpreted cau-
17We report medians, rather than means, of the samples because outliers can unduly
affect the means.
18An alternative explanation for the positive correlation between net worth and measured
average q is that households that report inflated values of the market value of their active
business would thereby increase their observed wealth and measured average q. To check
whether this measurement issue changes our results, we recalculated the ordering of aver-
age q using the book value of active business assets in net worth rather than the market
value. Under this alternative, any measurement error in book value would induce a negative
correlation between average q and net worth. With this alternative net worth measure, the
pattern between average q and net worth is weaker. While this alternative suggests that the
net worth results (though not the income results) should be interpreted with caution, it does
not permit us to discriminate between the measurement-error explanation and the explana-
tion that higher-net-worth households actually have active businesses with a higher q.Note: The SCF indudes five observations for each household with imputed values for missing data. The
number of households for each cell is an approximation since it represents the number of total observa-
tions divided by five. The reported medians reflect the population-weighted sample of householdswith
active businesses with book value exceeding $1,000.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances.
tiously, they are consistent with the idea that inframarginal investment
projects are concentrated among high-net-worth and high-income house-
holds. Assets with potential economic profit are relatively more concen-
trated among high-net-worth households than assets expected to return
the opportunity cost of capital (e.g., bonds, liquid assets, and housing).
To the extent that distributional analysis of consumption taxes assumes
that all returns to new capital are untaxed, it understates the prog-
ressivity of the consumption tax.
7. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF TAX
REFORM
7.1 Distributional Analysis in Current Practice
In practice, of course, distributional analysis does not demonstrate eq-
uity effects of alternative tax regimes or proposals. It simply provides
24Gentry & Hubbard
TABLE 5
Median Values of q for Households in the SCF
Sample Median q value
Approximate number
of households
Full sample 1.17 577
Net worth
0-50 percentile 1.00 18
50-75 percentile 1.13 47
75-90 percentile 1.14 62
90-95 percentile 1.00 53
95-99 percentile 1.58 135
99-100 percentile 2.07 261
Current income
0-50 percentile 1.00 52
50-75 percentile 1.15 62
75-90 percentile 1.25 74
90-95 percentile 1.00 47
95-99 percentile 1.50 105
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information that may help policymakers make judgments about equity.
Distributional analysis requires decisions about the time period, the defi-
nition of well-being, the household unit of analysis, and incidenceas-
sumptions. For many reforms, principled arguments can be made for
alternative resolutions of these decisions. Unfortunately, the principal
producers of distributional analysis for policymakersthe Treasury De-
partment, Joint Committee on Taxation, and Congressional Budget
Officedo not always use the same definitions and assumptions (see
the discussion in Hubbard, 1995). Below, we contrast the approachwe
have suggested with procedures generally employed in (Washington)
practice.
We have argued that it is straightforward to think of a consumption
tax as a combination of a wage tax and a cash flow tax on returns from
existing capital and returns from inframarginal investments. Thisap-
proach suggests that the burden of the tax be distributed to factorre-
turns as a change in labor and capital taxation (see also Browning and
Johnson, 1979, and Joint Committee on Taxation, 1993).19
In conventional distribution tables, distributing the burden of the tax
to wage income and income from old capital would increase theprog-
ressivity of taxes at low- and high-income relative to the case of distribu-
tion by consumption. Calculations by the Joint Committee on Taxation
(1993) indicate that, if the burden is assigned to realwages and income
from existing capital as earned, the burden of a five-percent broad-based
consumption tax is approximately proportional to (a broad concept of)
income. If, instead, the burden is assigned as consumptionoccurs, the
same tax appears regressive. Even the JCT approach of distributing the
burden of the consumption tax on returns to labor and existing capital
understates the progressivity of the tax. First, in conventional distribu-
tion tables, distributing the burden of the tax to wage income and old
capital income would increase the progressivity of taxes at low- and
high-income levels relative to the case of distributions by consumption.
In addition, if we think of the broad-based consumption taxas a
subtraction-method value-added tax (or business transfer tax), inclusion
of a household-level wage tax could increase progressivity measuredon
an annual income basis (e.g., by means of a refundable wage credit).
Indeed, recent analyses of distributional implications of fundamental
tax reform by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury Depart-
ment suggest that a switch from the current income tax to a flat tax is not
likely to be dubbed "regressive" even under currently usedassump-
'This is in contrast to the approach of Pechman and Okner (1974) and Pechman (1985), in
which consumption taxes are allocated to annual consumption.26Gentry & Hubbard
tions. As we noted above, the JCT analysis indicates that abroad-based
consumption tax is roughly proportional by income class. Incorporating
government transfers in the analysis would likely make thepredicted
change more progressive to the extent that transfers are increased in
response to any change in the pricelevel.
In the tradition of distributional analysis using annual income to mea-
sure ability to pay, Gale, Houser, andScholz (1996) compare the current
tax system with various versions of the Flat Tax. Intheir base compari-
son, they assume individual income taxes areborne by the taxpayer,
payroll taxes are borne by workers, and business income taxes areborne
by all owners of capital.2° Their analysis includes the graduated ratesof
the current tax system and household exemptions from recentproposals
for a Flat Tax. They find that for most income groups, a Flat Taxwould
not significantly change average tax burdens. There are twonotable
exceptions. First, low-income households would pay higher taxesdue to
the repeal of the Earned Income Tax Credit (though such a creditcould
be included in a modified Flat Tax). Second, a Flat Tax woulddecrease
taxes of households in the top one percent of the incomedistribution.
Our emphasis on consumption tax reform as a two-stage reformhigh-
lights its similarity with the fundamental reform of the income tax(CBIT)
suggested by the Treasury Department. As with the Flat Tax,CBIT
would apply to all businesses, corporate and noncorporate.Deductions
for neither interest nor dividend payments would be permitted,and a
tax would be collected at the entity level at a rateequal to the highest
marginal personal rate (as in the Flat Tax). Interest receipts, dividends,
and capital gains from asset sales would be excludable frominvestors'
income, so that the base for the individual tax is wages. Inprinciple, the
difference between CBIT and the consumption tax described hereis that
investment expenditures are expensed under the consumption tax,
while (an approximation to) economic depreciation is permittedunder
CBIT.2' Hence CBIT taxes the returns to marginal investments,which
are not taxed under the business componentof the Flat Tax.
7.2 Distribution Tables by Tax Regime: ProposedMethodology
To assess differences in tax burdens across tax regimesand for different
incidence assumptions for broad-based consumption taxes, we con-
20A fundamental difference between our analysis and that of Gale, Houser, andScholz is
that we emphasize differences in characteristics associated with risk and inframarginal
returns across assets (neither of which are included in the basic Harberger(1962) incidence
assumptions).
21The CBIT proposal described in U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) containsaddi-
tional, complicating features not described here.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax 27
struct distribution tables for tax burdens: Because thecurrent tax base
differs from a consumption tax both in its differentialtreatment of
capital taxation and by its inclusion of the opportunitycost of capital in
the tax base, we compare four different tax regimes:(1) a comprehen-
sive income tax with uniform capital income taxation;(2) a stylized
version of the current income tax base capturing themain features of
differential capital taxation; (3) a broad-basedconsumption tax assum-
ing the burden of the tax falls onwages; and (4) a broad-based con-
sumption tax assuming the tax base includes inframarginalreturns and
returns to risk-taking but excludes the opportunity cost of capitalfrom
the tax base.
To concentrate on differences in the tax bases,we analyze a flat rate
structure for all tax systems with the same marginal taxrate for house-
holds and business entities. While the graduatedtax rates of the current
tax system add progressivity to the tax base, they alsocreate many
timing issues which complicate the analysis. For example,graduated
rates lead to individuals' tax rates varyingover time due to income
fluctuations; with tax rates varying over time, householdscan alter the
timing of the realization of capital gainsor the receipt of retirement
income to minimize their tax payments. This tax-minimizingbehavior
complicates measuring the effective tax rateon such income. In addition,
differences in household and business tax ratescan affect organizational
form decisions and create timing incentives for thetransfer of income
from businesses to households. To mimicsome of the progressivity intro-
duced from graduated tax rates,we can estimate tax burdens under a flat
rate structure with a generous household exemption.23
For each tax regime or incidence assumption,we compute a measure
of the tax base for each household in the SCF. All fourcases include
reported labor income. Labor income includeswages, salaries, and pen-
The conventional description of the imposition ofa proportional consumption tax is the
combination of a proportional wage tax and a proportional taxon cash flow from existing
projectsa tax on "old capital" (see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987,and the applica-
tion in Joint Committee on Taxation, 1993). Any taxon old capital would be included in the
consumption tax base (as conventionally described as excluding all capitalincome) and in
our modified tax base (which includes some capital income); hence abstracting fromthe tax
on old capital does not affect the difference in the distribution of taxes paid under thetwo
depictions, our emphasis here. One could alternatively interpretour exercise as assuming
full transition relief for old capital or as reflecting thearguments in the Appendix that the
effect of the tax reform on equity prices is unlikely to beas adverse as suggested by
conventional analysis.
As will become clear below, because our measures of thetax bases capture accrual
income rather than realized income, even these simpletax rate structures would not
correspond to annual tax burdens generated by a simple flat ratesystem using current tax
rules.28Gentry & Hubbard
sion benefits.24 The more difficult issues arise inmeasuring capital in-
come and the share of capital income tobe included in each tax base.
Because reported capital income excludes many itemssuch as unrealized
capital gains and imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, we con-
struct measures of expected income using eachhousehold's stock of
various assets and expected rates of return on different assets.The differ-
ent tax bases include varying portions of imputedcapital income depend-
ing on the tax rules and our incidence assumptions.
7.2.1 Expected Returns and Asset Income Table6summarizes the types
of assets included in our analysis, the expected ratesof return, and the
proportion of each asset's return included in the taxbase ("inclusion
rates") for various tax regimes. We chose theseexpected rates of return
to correspond roughly to average values fromthe1980s.Using these
historical data should capture households' expectations in1989,the year
represented in the SCF household wealth data.The historical data
approximate the differences in risk characteristicsand inframarginal re-
turns between assets. In addition, thesehistorical returns may reflect
differences created by investor responses to differentialcapital taxation
under current tax rules. We simplify our analysis byassuming that ex-
pected rates of return do not depend on the choice of taxregime. Actual
tax reform could change both the absolutelevel of rates of return and the
relative differences across assets; however, the directionand size of the
changes in expected rates of return is uncertain (see, e.g.,Feldstein,
1995).We also assume that household portfolio allocationsremain con-
stant across the different tax regimes.
Treasury bonds have an expected return of 10 percent,which exceeds
the return on liquid assets(5percent) and CDs(9percent), reflecting the
value of liquidity and banking services. Tax-exemptbonds, with a return
of8.5percent, bear an implicit tax relative to Treasurybonds. Corporate
bonds earn a risk premium of two percentage points over Treasurybonds.
The return on corporate equity reflects the pre-tax return on corpo-
rate investmets. Thus we imputecorporate-level income to house-
holds with corporate equity. Stock market data indicatesinvestors
earned a16.5percent return during the1980sin the stock market (high
24 For retirees in the late 1980s, most retirement benefits were from defined benefit pension
plans. The current tax system and consumption tax proposalswould include these benefits
in the tax base. In principle, a comprehensive income tax would taxworkers on these
benefits and the associated capital income as they are earned; in practice,however, a
comprehensive income tax would probably resort to taxing benefitswhen received.
We do not use the 1992 SCF data because we use questions on thebook value of active























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by historical standards but only a 6.5 percent premium over Treasury
bonds). This return includes both dividends and capital gains. To adjust
this return for taxes paid by corporations, we gross up this return by 25
percent. The return on retirement accounts assumes a portfolio of half
corporate equities and half taxable (noncorporate) debt.
The return on housing (10 percent) reflects the imputed consumption
flow and any expected appreciation in housing prices. We assign the
same expected return to investment real estate and owner-occupied
housing so that households should be indifferent between investing in
owner-occupied housing and rental property. To the extent that invest-
ment real estate earns a risk premium, we have understated the return
on these assets. Moreover, if housing bears an implicit tax due to its
favorable tax treatment, one could argue for owner-occupied housing
having a lower expected return than other real estate.
For active businesses, we use reported income because it is unclear
how to separate labor and capital income; furthermore, we expect sub-
stantially more heterogeneity in the returns to investing in active busi-
nesses than in financial assets. We assume passive businesses earn an
expected return equal to the expected return on investing in the stock
market (16.5 percent); because many passive businesses are not corpora-
tions, we do not impute a corporate tax liability to these returns.
7.2.2 Capital Income in the Various Tax Bases The comprehensive in-
come tax base is quite simple in theoryall forms of income are included
in the tax base. Our calculation of expected income from various assets
simplifies measuring this tax base relative to the alternative with unreal-
ized gains and imputed rents. For corporate equities, we include the
expected return on stocks as income accrues. Our one exception to the
rule of not adjusting expected returns across the tax systems is the ex-
pected return on tax-exempt debt under a comprehensive income tax. A
comprehensive income tax would include the interest on currently tax-
exempt bonds. To prevent these bonds from being dominated by taxable
bonds, we assign the same expected return to taxable and tax-exempt
government bonds. In Table 6, this change appears as an inclusion rate
greater than one for the income earned from tax-exempt bonds. For both
the comprehensive income tax and current tax rules, we assume that the
reported income from active businesses is a good measure of taxable
income. In addition to including all forms of capital income, the compre-
hensive income tax would allow deductions for all interest paid.
The inclusion rates for the current income tax base reflect (albeit impre-
cisely) the major forms of differential capital taxation. Interest income
(except on tax-exempt bonds) is included in the tax base. CorporateDistribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax31
equity bears a "double tax" which leads to an inclusion rate of less than
two both because corporations pay dividends from after-tax income and
because special provisions for capital gains substantially reduce the
personal-level tax on equity (e.g., deferral and the step-up of basis at
death).26 Owning stock through mutual funds bears a slightly higher tax
since mutual fund ownership offers fewer personal tax advantages. If
personal tax rates are constant over time, assets held in retirementac-
counts do not bear personal taxes. However, because equity invest-
ments held inside retirement accounts have associated corporate tax
liabilities, we impute some tax liability to these accounts. On theone
hand, if retirement accounts were held entirely in corporate equities, the
inclusion rate would be one. On the other hand, if the accountswere
entirely government debt, the inclusion rate would be zero. The returns
on miscellaneous financial assets (e.g., whole life insurance) benefit
greatly from deferral, leading to an inclusion rate of 0.25. Despitea small
portion of housing capital gains being taxed, we approximate the current
income tax as not taxing any of the return to housing. The tax base
includes income from real estate, active businesses, and passive busi-
nesses. Following current tax rules, we allow for deductions for interest
associated with mortgages, investment real estate, and margin loans.27
Unlike the current tax base, our stylized version does not allow for
differences in other itemized deductions (such as charitable giving)or
tax credits (such as the Earned Income Tax Credit) across households.
Under the traditional incidence assumption of distributing a consump-
tion tax according to wage income,28 the inclusion rates for all types of
capital income are zero. Apportioning active business income between
As an example of the inclusion rate of 1.35 for corporate equities, assume a pre-tax rate
of return of 22 percent, a flat 25 percent tax rate for corporations, a flat 25 percent tax rate
for dividends and realized capital gains, and a target dividend yield equal to 20 percent of
the total return on equity. We assume that through deferral and other provisions the
effective tax rate on capital gains is one-third of the tax rate on dividends. For a pre-
corporate-tax return of 22 percent, the shareholder's total return is 16.5 percent. This total
return implies a dividend yield of 3.3 percent which would equal 2.475 percent after the
dividend tax. The capital gain of 13.2 percent faces an effective tax rate of 8.333 percent;
hence the after-tax capital gain is 12.1 percent. The total after-tax shareholder return is
14.575 percent. The total tax burden on the investment of 7.425 percent implies a total tax
rate of 33.75. Expressed as a fraction of the flat 25 percent tax rate, this total tax rate implies
an indusion rate of 1.35. For mutual funds, the calculation is similar except we assume the
effective tax rate on capital gains is one-half of the tax rate on dividends. These inclusion
rates depend on the statutory tax rates, the value of deferral, and corporate dividend
policy, but they do not depend on the gross rate of return.
While we allow all households to deduct these forms of interest, we do not adjust for
changes in the probability that households will itemize.
Recall that we are abstracting from the portion of the consumption tax faffing on "old
capital."32Gentry & Hubbard
returns to capital and labor creates a problem for the consumption tax
base. We estimate the expected return to capital from the active busi-
nesses by multiplying the market value of the businessby the investor's
pre-personal-tax alternative of earning 16.5 percent by investing in stock
market equity. By using the market value of the active business, this
measure of expected capital income captures anyinframarginal returns
which are capitalized into the market value of the business. Using an
expected return for risky investments includes both the opportunity cost
of capital and a risk premium into the expected capital income. The
difference between realized active business income and this expected
capital income figure measures the labor income from the business and
any ex post good or bad luck for the year.
Under our incidence assumption that a consumption tax excludes the
opportunity cost of capital but not inframarginal returns or the return
to risk-taking, the tax base excludes returns on bonds (exceptthe risk
premium portion of corporate bonds), miscellaneous financial assets,
houses, and real estate. The business cash flow tax component of the
consumption tax implies a tax on the portion of equity returns attribut-
able to risk or inframarginal returns. Because we estimate the gross
expected return on equity to be 22 percent compared to a default-risk-
free bond return of 10 percent, a substantial portion of the return to
equity appears in excess of the return to waiting. Thus we include 60
percent of the returns to corporate equity in the tax base.29 Giventhe
portfolio allocation for retirement accounts, this assumed tax burden on
corporate equity is consistent with an inclusion rate of 40 percent. The
tax base excludes the returns to miscellaneous financial assets, owner-
occupied housing, and real estate. For active businesses, we want to
remove the opportunity cost of capital from thereported income figure.
We estimate the opportunity cost of capital as the default-risk-free re-
turn (equal to the return on government bonds) on the bookvalue of
capital. We use the book value of capital rather than the market value
of capital to avoid measuring the return on any inframarginal value
capitalized in the market value. We assume that passive assets are
risky, and we use an inclusion rate of 60 percent for these returns.
7.2.3 Limitations from Using Wealth Data While we estimate the distri-
bution of the tax base using wealth data, several data limitations may
affect our estimates. First, the labor income question in the SCF does not
29For simplicity, we allocate corporate taxes in proportion to ownership of corporate
equity rather than taking a general equilibrium approach which might suggest the inci-
dence of corporate taxes falls on returns to all forms of capital.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax33
ask respondents to include non-cash compensation, such as fringe bene-
fits. The current income tax base does not include these items; however,
either a comprehensive income tax or a consumption tax (by not allow-
ing employers to deduct the cost of noncash compensation) would in-
clude noncash compensation.
Second, because we use the expected returns to financial assets,our
estimates do not include any ex post differences in rates of return across
households. To the extent these differences in rates of return flow
through business entities, the differences between expected and realized
returns would be included in the tax base estimates in all cases except
the consumption tax under the wage tax incidence assumption. How-
ever, the tax rate on the difference between expected and realized re-
turns may be higher under current tax rules because these gains (or
losses) are subject to more than one level of taxation. Overall, using
realized rates of return rather than expected rates of return would havea
similar effect on the tax base in all of the cases except thewage tax
incidence assumption for the consumption tax. We also use expected
rates of return in creating our income-based measure of well-being. Us-
ing realized rates of return would affect the ordering of households by
placing households with good fortune higher in the income distribution
and those with bad fortune lower in the income distribution.
Third, for financial assets, we assign the same expected rates of return
to all households regardless of their levels of income or wealth. If afflu-
ent households systematically have a higher opportunity cost return on
capital than less well-off households, then our assumption would lead to
an understatement of the extent to which switching to a consumption
tax would benefit affluent households. While ex post returns are almost
certainly higher for better-off households (in terms of the ex post income
or wealth distribution), it is less clear why expected rates of return (espe-
cially on financial assets) would vary by household.
7.2.4 Structure of Tax RatesAfter imputing each household's tax base
under the four tax regimes or incidence assumptions, we apply a tax rate
structure to each household's tax base. As mentioned above, because
our methodology is ill-suited for graduated tax rates, we focus on either
a flat 25 percent tax or a flat 25 percent tax with household exemptions of
$15,000 for single households and $25,000 for married households. For
households with negative income, we classify the tax burden to be zero
rather than paying a refund to the household. Because the tax rate and
exemption levels are the same but the size of the tax base varies across
regimes, total government revenues are not the same across tax regimes.
For a given exemption level, these revenue differences do not affect the34Gentry & Hubbard
percentage of taxes paid across households because with aflat rate, tax pay-
ments are distributed in proportion to the tax baseregardless of the tax
rate. Of course, the differences across tax systems inthe level of mar-
ginal tax rates and tax rates on different types of income will haveeffi-
ciency consequences nor does our analysis include anybehavioral
changes induced by differences in tax rates.
7.3 Distribution Tables by Tax Regime: Evidence
In Table 7, we present the distribution of tax burdensby income group
across our different incidence assumptions.For classifying household
income, we use the imputed full household income, the taxbase for the
comprehensive income tax. By including the imputed incomefrom
owner-occupied housing, the inside build-up on defined contribution
pension plans, and unrealized capital gains, our measure ofhousehold
income is closer in spirit to the family economic income measureof the
Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis than income definitions
used by the Joint Committee on Taxation of the CongressionalBudget
Office.3° We use this broad measure of income because our analysis
concerns the relative tax treatment of abroad spectrum of capital in-
come. The table reports the percentof tax paid by each of twelve
income groups. The first nine groups are the first nine dedilesof the
income distribution. The tenth group is the 91st to 95thpercenifie of
the income distribution, the eleventh group is the 96th to 99th percen-
tile of the distribution, and the twelfth group is the top one percentof
the income distribution.
The top panel of the table presents the distribution of taxespaid for tax
systems without a household exemption. We considerfour tax regimes,
as described in Table 6, labeled"Comprehensive income tax," "Current
tax base," "Consumption tax, traditional," and "Consumptiontax, modi-
fied." As a simple metric of the claim that consumption taxesdispropor-
tionately benefit high-income taxpayers, we compare the percentof the
tax burden allocated to the top 5 percent of the incomedistribution.
Under the four cases, this group would pay between 27.1 percentof
taxes under the wage tax incidence assumption and 37.5 percentof the
taxes under current income tax rules. Assuming that aconsumption tax
does not tax any capital income suggests that moving to abroad-based
consumption tax would reduce the fraction of taxes paid bythe top 5
° See Hubbard (1995) for an overview of the methods of distributional analysis of the
principal government tax policy agencies. Our measure does not conform to anyspecific
agency's model because of differences in data. Specifically, given its focus onhousehold
wealth, the SCF asks fewer questions on transfer payments and non-cashcompensation


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































percent of the income distribution by over 25 percent (a dropof over ten
percentage points). Refining the incidence assumption for a consump-
tion tax to exclude only the opportunity cost of capital suggeststhat the
top 5 percent of the income distribution would pay 30.9percent of taxes.
Thus recognizing that the consumption tax base includes partof what is
commonly called capital income weakens the argument that moving
from the current tax rules to a broad-based consumption tax would favor
high-income taxpayers. The ten-percentage-point decrease in the frac-
tion of taxes paid by the top income group under a "wage" taxrelative to
the current tax base falls by over one-third after refining the incidence
assumption for the consumption tax.
Comparing the current tax base with the "consumption tax" (assum-
ing it only excludes the opportunity cost of capital), Table7 suggests
households in the fifth through tenth income groups would pay a
higher fraction of taxes. However, the increase in taxes paid for these
groups is smaller than that impliedunder conventional distributional
assumptions.
The second panel of Table 7 calculates the distribution of the tax burden
across income groups for a tax systemwith household exemptions.31
Incorporating these household exemptions does not substantially change
the conclusion from the top panel of the table. The decline in thefraction
of taxes paid by the top 5 percent of the income distribution from moving
to a broad-based consumption tax is again aboutone-third less under the
assumption of the consumption tax excluding only the opportunity costof
capital rather than the assumption of a consumption tax exemptingall
capital income. Our estimated differences between the distributionof a
consumption tax under our assumptions and under traditional assump-
tions would be larger if we use asset return data from the 1990s. During
the 1990s, default-risk-free nominal interest rates were much lowerthan
in the 1980s; hence a smaller amount of capital income would betaxed by
the income tax and not the consumption tax in the more recentperiod.
As an alternative to income as a measure of economic well-being,Table
8 presents the distribution of tax burdens over the distributionof net
worth. Overall, the distribution of taxes paid is more evenly distributed
across the net worth distribution than acrossthe income distribution. One
reason for this more even distribution isthat annual fluctuations in in-
come can affect both a household's tax paymentsand relative position in
the income distribution but will have less effect on its position in the net
worth distribution. In comparing the current tax base with the different
31Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba (this volume) also describe the distributional implica-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































incidence assumptions for the consumption tax, the same conclusion
emerges from the net worth distribution as for the incomedistribution:
the decrease in the fraction of taxes paid by the top 5 percent of the net
worth distribution accompanying a switch to a broad-based consumption
tax is about one-third smaller, assuming the consumption tax base in-
cludes part of capital income.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The desirability of fundamental tax reform depends on how it changes the
efficiency, simplicity, and fairness of the tax system. Of the three elements,
"fairness" appears to be the most controversial for recent proposals to
move the U.S. tax system toward a broad-based consumption tax.Distribu-
tional consequences of these proposals depend on both short-run (transi-
tion) and long-run gains and losses. Our analysis classifies the components
of the tax reform into a two-stage process. First, most elements of consump-
tion tax reform are consistent with moving to a pure income tax with uni-
form capital taxation. Second, for moving from this pure income tax to a
consumption tax, the key element of reform is replacing depreciation allow-
ances for physical investment with expensing of capital assets.
The switch from a pure income tax to a consumption tax is likely to be
less regressive than commonly assumed. Despite the claim that consump-
tion taxes do not tax capital income, replacing depreciation allowances
with expensing only eliminates the taxation of the opportunity cost of
capital and not capital income attributable to inframarginal returns and
luck (either good or bad). Because wealthier households receive a larger
portion of what is often called their capital income in the forms treated
similarly by income and consumption taxes (ex post returns to risk taking
and inframarginal returns), a consumption tax is less regressive than
would be suggested by assuming a consumption tax exempts all parts of
capital income. Our distributional analysis suggests that more than one-
third of the reduction in the share of taxes paid by very high-income
households in switching from an income tax to a consumption tax is offset
by this effect.
Our analysis illustrates the benefits of separating the parts of tax re-
form inherent to taxing consumption from those associated with a
broad-based income tax. For the debate over fundamental tax reform,
the advantages and disadvantages of eliminating differential capital in-
come taxation can be separated from the choice between income and
consumption as the tax base; moreover, in some cases, the elimination of
differential capital taxation may be the more important of the two issues.
While we only analyze the equity consequences of tax reform, this sepa-Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax39
ration is also likely to be important for assessing gains in economic
efficiency and simplicity.
APPENDIX: EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM ON ASSET PRICES
In our estimation of the burden of a consumption tax, we treated conven-
tional distributional assumptions as equivalent to those for a wage tax.
That is, we abstracted from the "tax on old capital" associated with a
cold-turkey switch from an income tax to a consumption tax. This as-
sumption does not affect our comparison of the distribution of the tax
burden under conventional distributional assumptions for a consump-
tion tax and those we suggest here. We also believe that the tax on old
capital is likely to be much smaller than conventionally believed, as we
argue below for equities, debt, and housing.
A. EQUITY PRICES
A switch from the current income tax to a consumption tax affects stock
prices both by changing the tax treatment of deductions for depreciation
and interest and by changing the taxation of capital income. As weargue
below, tax reform can in principle either raise or lower stock prices at the
time of the reform. In particular, we examine the effect of tax reformon
equity prices by identifying impacts of tax reform on the demand for and
supply of equities.
A.1 Demand for Equities
Four factors bode well for the demand for stocks in response to tax
reform. First, the exemption from investor-level taxation of returns to
saving should increase household saving and the demand for equities
(and other financial assets). Second, the elimination of the capital gains
tax increases the return on equities and reduces effective costs of trading
equities (because the capital gains tax is both a tax on equity returns and
a transaction tax), thereby stimulating investors' demand for equities.
Third, to the extent that investor-level dividend taxes are capitalized in
share prices, they reduce the value of equities1; by eliminating the taxon
dividends, a consumption tax may increase the demand for equities and
equity prices may rise. Fourth, to the extent that tax reform reduces the
See, for example, Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977). There is significant
disagreement among economists about the extent to which dividend taxes are capitalized
in share prices (see the review of evidence in U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992).40Gentry & Hubbard
tax rate on business income, the present value ofafter-tax returns on
business investments rises, and equity prices rise.
Two features of these arguments are noteworthy. First,taken in isola-
lion, they suggest a significant potential stimulus to equitydemand and
stock prices from fundamental tax reform. Second, mostchannels are
consistent with fundamental income tax reform as well as withthe move
to a consumption tax. A move toward integrating the corporateand indi-
vidual income taxes would produce roughly similar consequences for
equity demand.
Three potentially negative factors for equity demand andstock prices
can be traced to elements of taxreform to the shift from depreciation of
capital assets under the income tax to the expensing of capital assets
under the income tax to the expensing of capital assets under the con-
sumption tax. Under the income tax, the effective cost perdollar of
capital goods purchased equals $(1 - tz), where t, is the corporate tax
rate and z is the present value of depreciation deductionsfor the in-
vested dollar. Under the consumption tax, capital investment is ex-
pensed, so that z rises to unity, and effective cost per dollar of capital
goods purchased falls to $(l - ta). That is, one can think of investment
incentives accompanying expensing as reducing the price of a capital
good. If "new capital" purchased under the expensing (consumption
tax) regime is otherwise the same as "old capital" in place underthe
depreciation (income tax) regime, the price of old capital will fall. In this
sense, investment incentives reduce thestock market value of existing
capital. This is the argument advanced by Hall (1996) in last year's vol-
ume. At the current corporate tax rateof 35 percent, the move from
current law to expensing for equipment investment wouldimply a
change in the value of (1 - tz) from 0.71 to 0.65, for a predicted decline
in equity values (holding other factors constant) of about 8 percent.2
One must also place such a reform in context. The United States legis-
lated major changes in corporate tax rates (e.g., in the Tax Reform Actof
1986) and in investment incentives (e.g., in the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 or in the Tax Reform Act of 1986) over the past two decades.
Shifts in the value of investment incentives of a similar magnitude oc-
curred as a consequence of the 1981 Tax Act (in which investment incen-
tives were made more generous such as those accompanying a switch to
a consumption tax) and the 1986 Tax Act (inwhich investment incentives
were made less generous).
2Auerbach (1996) estimates that the change from the current tax system to expensing under
the HallRabushka Flat Tax would, all else being equal, reduce equity values by 5.7 percent.
If transition relief is grantedin the form of allowing all existing assets to continue to receive
depreciation allowancesthe loss in equity values from expensing falls to 1.7 percent.Distribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax41
There is another consideration: A move from the current income tax to
a consumption tax is likely to incorporate a business-level tax rate lower
than the current corporate income tax rate of 35 percent. At a rate of 21
percent (argued by the Treasury Department to be a revenue-neutral
rate), for example, the combination of expensing and the lower tax rate
actually increases the value of (1 - tz) to 0.79 from its current-law value of
0.71. The fall in the tax rate on business income raises the demand for
business equity and stock prices, and stimulates the supply of business
equity and investment.
Even if expensing effects dominate and the stock market value of old
capital falls, this simple sketch assumes that firms can costlessly adjust
their fixed capital stock to take advantage of changes in expected profit-
ability or in the tax treatment of investment. This is unlikely to be true,
however. Economic studies of investment have shown that firms face
costs installing new capital goods, leading firms to smooth changes in
the capital stock over time. If these "adjustment costs" are high, old
capital remains valuable relative to new capital, and stock prices need
not fall. If adjustment costs are low, the shift to expensing (in isolation)
reduces stock prices. In their review of existing studies, Hassett and
Hubbard (1997) conclude that adjustment costs are relatively low,so that
focusing on the changes in t. and z in analyzing tax reforms is likely to be
sensible for estimating consequences for stock prices.
As a second factor adversely affecting the demand for equities, a cold-
turkey elimination of interest deductions would also reduce stock val-
ues. At the margin, the removal of interest deductions is balanced by the
gain to the firm from expensing. However, removal of interest deduc-
tions on existing debt generates no such offsetting gain and representsa
loss for firms with debt issued under the income tax regime to the extent
that such debt cannot be refinanced at lower interest rates.
Third, financial institutions managing long-term contractual saving
for households currently are major players in the market for equities. In
1996, private pension funds held 13.5 percent of U.S. equities, with 8.5
percent held by state and local government pension plans and 4.3
percent held by life insurance companies. In addition, some of the
equities held by mutual funds represent individually directed retire-
ment saving through Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans,
and 401(k) plans. Under a consumption tax, all forms of saving receive
preferential tax treatment. Hence saving through life insurance and
pension plans becomes less relatively attractive than under current law.
If households save the same amount in unrestricted savings vehicles as
they do through current contractual arrangements and if households
allocate this saving in the same way as institutional managers, then tax42Gentry & Hubbard
reform's negative impact on contractual saving will be offset by its
positive effect on other saving. Some economists argue that many
households might reduce overall saving absent contractual arrange-
ments or might hold less equity than institutional managers.If true, the
negative effect of tax reform on contractual saving might reduce the
demand for equities.
A.2 Supply of Equities
Two factors are likely to affect the supply of equities in response to tax
reform. First, the shift from depreciation to expensing raises busi-
nesses' demand for financing to fund new investment projects. Hence
gross equity and debt issues should increasefollowing tax reform. This
effect will vary by industry, with greater volumes of expected new
issues from firms in capital-intensive industries most directlybenefited
by tax reform. Second, the removal of the tax bias against equityfinanc-
ing inherent in the current tax system wifi lead corporations toincrease
the use of equity in their existing capital structure. Hence someequity
issues may be expected to refinance outstanding debt obligations.This
effect is also likely to vary by industry according to differences inde-
sired leverage.
A.3 Summary
The conventional argument that equity prices should fall in response to
consumption tax reformbecause of the negative effect of expensing on
the value of "old capital"likely overstates the adverse short-run effect
of tax reform on equity prices. Equity prices should decline by a lesser
amount and may even increase modestly in response to taxreform. This
is particularly true in cases for which it takes firms a significantperiod of
time to make new capital investments; in this case, existing investments
earn higher after-tax returns in response to thelower marginal tax rates
following tax reform. In addition, some of the predicted impact on eq-
uity prices would materialize under broad-based income taxreform.
B. DEBT PRICES
The effect of tax reform on the prices of existing debt depends on the
change in the economy's price level in response to tax reform. For a credit-
invoice value-added tax (VAT) or retail sales tax, the domestic priceof
consumption goods should rise by the amount of the tax (assuming mone-
tary accommodation of the tax change by the centralbank). As a conse-
quence, debtholders see a reduction in the valueof nominal debt; the
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lion goods equivalent to the amount of the tax. Under a destination-based
VAT, foreign debtholders do not lose to the extent that they are buying
trade goods; under an origin-basis VAT, if exchange rate adjustmentsare
less than complete, foreign debtholders lose purchasing power. Fora
consumption tax of the Flat Tax form, it is less likely that the purchasing
power of debt would change.
C. HOUSING PRICES
Conventional wisdom holds that, absent transition rules, a switch toa
consumption tax would significantly reduce housing values, the princi-
pal asset for many households. As with equities, the analysis of the
impact of tax reform on housing is not as straightforward as it might first
appear.
In principle, broad-based consumption taxes impose the consumption
tax on the service value of housing structures. In practice, none of the
leading consumption tax proposals actually measures and taxes the
value of the service flows from houses. They instead impose an equiva-
lent tax at the time the houses are constructed. As a consequence, struc-
tures are taxed equivalently whether they are owned or rented.
To see this, consider the two housing tenure choices (that is, renting
versus owning) separately. In the rental case, the owner would expense
the new structure (as a capital investment) and would then pay taxon
the rental receipts. If tax rates and interest rates do not change, the
upfront subsidy and the ongoing tax have the same present value (as,
for example, would be the case for an IRA). In the owner-occupiedcase,
the same is truethe lack of an upfront deduction (expensing) is just
offset by the present value of not paying the tax on imputed rent. In both
cases, housing does not enjoy the investment boom experienced in other
capital goods because the tax would be extended to (previously untaxed)
housing services.
Popular discussion focuses more on the loss of the home mortgage
interest deduction. Understanding the consequences of elimination of the
mortgage interest deduction requires the same analysis as that for taxable
interest rates generally. In a closed economy, if all taxpayers are equally
subject to interest taxation, removing both interest deductions and the
taxation of interest income could result in a decline in mortgage interest
rates by the amount of the tax. Because of the differential taxation of
interest income, however, mortgage interest rates are likely to decline by
less than the amount of the tax. Hence in the short run, the removal of the
mortgage interest deduction should reduce prices of existing houses.
One must be careful about making "doomsday" predictions about the44Gentry & Hubbard
effects of tax reform on housing prices, however. Fluctuations in hous-
ing demand can be explained in large part by movements in the user cost
of homeownership, which measures the marginal cost of anincremental
amount of owner-occupied housing, including theforegone return on
the owner's equity. Because mortgage interest is deductible under the
income tax, increases in marginal tax rates reduce the user cost ofhome-
ownership, all else being equal, while decreases in marginal tax rates
increase the user cost. Under a consumption tax, mortgage interest
would no longer be deductible, thereby raising the user cost of home-
ownership and reducing housing demand, all else being equal.
Note, however, that fluctuations in nominal interest rates and expected
rates of inflation also affect the user cost of homeownership.High interest
rates, all else being equal, raise the user cost.High expected rates of
inflation, all else being equal, reduce the user cost of homeownership
because households deduct the nominal rather than the real interest cost.
Poterba (1991) examines variation in the user cost of homeownership
between 1970 and 1990 traceable to tax and nontax sources. He finds that
marginal tax rate variation explains virtually none of the change in the
user cost of homeownership forhouseholds with adjusted gross income
of $30,000 or $50,000. Households with adjusted gross income of$250,000
experienced tax-induced increases in the user cost of capital following the
reduction in marginal rates in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981and
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. While the user cost rose by about 1.8 percent-
age points for high-income taxpayersbetween 1980 and 1990, the increase
in the user cost including changes in interest rates and expectedinflation
rose by more than 7 percentage points.Hence one should not overstate
the role played by tax considerations in explaining changes in the user
cost of homeownership. One can also make this point byintrospection.
Mortgage interest rates declined by about 2 percentage pointsbetween
November 1994 and December 1995, an amount not too differentfrom the
tax wedge for middle-income households. Thischange was not met by a
boom in housing prices.
Another qualification to the predicted decline in owner-occupiedhous-
ing prices in response to tax reform is that the user costof rental prop-
erty, which reflects the landlord's cost of investing in the property,also
changes in response to tax reform. As with owner-occupiedhousing, the
user cost of rental property rises withthe elimination of interest de-
ductibility. However, the move from depreciation to expensing reduces
the user cost. On balance, if interest rates fall by less thanthe tax wedge
of the marginal investor in rental property (likely a high-tax-bracket
investor), the first effect dominates, and the user cost of rental property
would rise in response to the switch to a consumption tax. The higherDistribution of Broad-Based Consumption Tax45
rental user cost implies that real rents would rise, blunting the down-
ward pressure on owner-occupied housing from tax reform.
To summarize, a switch from the current tax system to a flat tax or
other broad-based consumption tax will likely depress house prices in
the short run, but on'y modestly. The largest such declines should be
concentrated in regions in which there are many homeowning house-
holds with currently high marginal tax ratesfor example, the New
York and Chicago metropolitan areas and parts of California. To the
extent that housing investment is highly leveraged in these areas, some
increase in mortgage default rates might be expected.
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